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Re-Victimization and the Asylum Process:
Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch: Re-Assessing
the Weight Placed on Credible Fear
Interviews in Determining Credibility
Alana Mosley†
Introduction
On July 12, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held in Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch that notes from
a credible fear interview may be an unreliable basis for an adverse
credibility finding.1 The court also found in this case that both the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the immigration judge
improperly overlooked material evidence that corroborated the
testimony of Ana Veronica Jimenez Ferreira (“Ms. Jimenez”).2 Ms.
Jimenez fled the Dominican Republic, seeking asylum in the United
States from her common-law husband, who had repeatedly beaten,
raped, stalked, and threatened to kill her and her two children.3
The immigration judge had found her testimony incredible due to
her failure to note the precise time and location of the attacks.4
Ms. Jimenez’s story illustrates the struggle many asylees
experience as they maneuver through the asylum process. They
must process their trauma and adequately articulate the nature
and context of the traumatic event, or events, in a linear narrative
that an immigration judge will find credible.5 While telling one’s
story of trauma may often help the healing process, in the asylum
context, survivors are faced with the possibility of being found
incredible and being sent back to the country they fled.
†. J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to
thank my parents, Tony and Sylvia Mosley, for their constant encouragement and
support of my dreams and ambitions. I would also like to thank the staff and editors
of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their help preparing this
Article for publication. Last, but not least, I must thank my friends, Priscilla
Willmott and Katelyn Nieman, for always being the support system I can count on
throughout my journey as a survivor.
1. 831 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2016).
2. Id. at 810.
3. Id. at 805.
4. Id. at 808.
5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii–iii), 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii–iii) (2012).
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This Article will provide an overview of Jimenez Ferreira v.
Lynch. Part I outlines the background of Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch.
Part II discusses the process of affirmative asylum. Part III
provides insight into the concept of re-victimization and the impact
that past trauma can have on a survivor’s memory. Next, Part IV
addresses the nature of credible fear interviews and the training
provided to the officers who conduct them. Part V focuses on the
approaches utilized by different circuits for determining the weight
given to credible fear interviews. Finally, Part VI calls for more
circuits to follow the approach utilized by the Seventh Circuit in
Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch.
I.

Background

Ms. Jimenez, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, applied for
asylum and withholding of removal in the United States based on
her particular social group membership, which was described as
“Dominican women in relationships they cannot leave.”6 Ms.
Jimenez fled to the United States to escape her abusive commonlaw husband, Ramon Holguin (“Mr. Holguin”).7 Her story of
persecution began in 2007—when she returned home along with her
children after attending a Christmas party, Mr. Holguin beat,
choked, and raped her in their bedroom.8 She tried to escape
physical harm by staying at a friend’s house and filing a complaint
with the police in the Dominican Republic.9 Mr. Holguin was
arrested, but released from jail four days later.10 He began stalking
Ms. Jimenez at her workplace and threatened to kill her if she and
her children did not come back to live with him.11
Out of fear for both her and her children’s lives, she quit her
job and moved approximately fifty miles away to her hometown of
Bonao to stay with her mother.12 In 2009, Mr. Holguin managed to
find her and break into her mother’s home, where he beat and
threatened Ms. Jimenez until her mother called for the aid of
neighbors.13 Two months later, Mr. Holguin returned, kidnapped
6. See Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 805.
7. Id. at 806.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. (“There is no indication in the record that he was ever prosecuted for the
incident.”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 806–07.
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Ms. Jimenez by forcing her into his car, and raped her in the
woods.14 After this assault, Mr. Holguin continued to harass her by
sending letters threatening to kill her and the children if she did
not return to him.15 Out of fear that Mr. Holguin would kill her,
Ms. Jimenez fled to the United States to seek asylum with the hope
of being able to bring her children to the United States if her asylum
was granted.16
Ms. Jimenez entered the United States in Texas and was
immediately detained by United States Border Patrol.17 Three
weeks later, she told an asylum officer that she was fleeing from her
common-law husband.18 The credible fear interview took place over
the telephone while Ms. Jimenez was in detention. Since Ms.
Jimenez only speaks Spanish, an interpreter had to relay the
information to the asylum officer.19 The asylum officer found that
“[t]here [was] a significant possibility that the assertions
underlying [Ms. Jimenez’s] claim could be found credible in a full
asylum or withholding of removal hearing.”20 However, the
immigration judge held that Ms. Jimenez was ineligible for asylum
and withholding of removal on the basis that Ms. Jimenez was not
credible due to “glaring inconsistencies,” and because Ms. Jimenez
lacked evidence to support her testimony.21
The “glaring inconsistencies” that bothered the immigration
judge the most related to the 2007 attack.22 The police complaint
and the notes from Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear interview gave the
impression that Mr. Holguin attacked her before she and her
children left for the Christmas party, but at her 2013 removal
14. Id. at 807.
15. Id.
16. Id. Despite Ms. Jimenez’s flight to the United States, Mr. Holguin continued
to send letters to her mother threatening “to kill them all.” Ms. Jimenez’s mother
reported the letters to police, but police in the Dominican Republic, Ms. Jimenez
alleges, “don’t help the women” and “don’t do anything.” Id.
17. Id. at 806. When she was first detained, an immigration officer asked her if
she feared returning to the Dominican Republic and Ms. Jimenez stated that she did
not. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 807–08; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“Where the trier of
fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that corroborates
otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided . . . .”).
22. See Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 809, 808 (7th Cir. 2016). Other
inconsistencies between Ms. Jimenez’s testimony in court and her credible fear
interview were the date she was last raped, where she was last raped, and whether
Mr. Holguin had hit her son. Id.
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hearing, Ms. Jimenez stated that the violence happened when she
returned home from the party.23 The immigration judge overlooked
the medical report which noted the injuries that Ms. Jimenez
suffered due to this attack.24 On appeal, the BIA upheld the
immigration judge’s decision.25 On further appeal, the Seventh
Circuit found that Ms. Jimenez had consistently maintained that
Mr. Holguin raped her on Christmas Eve and that the medical
report strongly supported her claim.26 Thus, the precise time of day
that the violence occurred was found to be a trivial discrepancy that
the immigration judge should not use as the basis for an adverse
credibility finding.27
II. The Process of Affirmative Asylum
Applying for asylum is a process by which an immigrant may
seek protection in the United States based on past persecution they
have suffered or based on a well-founded fear of future persecution,
due to their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.28 The purpose of asylum law is to
provide a safe haven to those who meet these statutory
requirements.29 To be found eligible, an immigrant must be
physically present in the United States or seeking entry into the
United States at a port of entry and must file an affirmative asylum
claim within one year of their arrival.30 Some asylum seekers may
be excluded on the grounds that they can relocate to another area
of their home country safely or had previously resettled safely in a
third country prior to coming to the United States.31

23. Id.
24. Id. at 807 (“[B]ruises and scratches on [Ms.] Jimenez’s body, as well as ‘visible
signs and marks of a strangulation attempt’ and a ‘torn inner and outer labia of the
vagina, evidencing penetration by force or with resistance on the part of the
victim.’”).
25. Id. at 808.
26. Id. at 811.
27. Id.; see also Tawuo v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
inconsistencies cited by immigration judges “should not be trivial”).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see also Asylum, USCIS,
https://www.uscis.gov/ humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum (last updated May 12,
2017).
29. § 1159(b).
30. § 1158(a)(2)(B); The Affirmative Asylum Process, USCIS (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylumprocess.
31. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
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With affirmative asylum, the applicant will file their asylum
application, Form I-589, with the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS).32 In this situation, the applicant is
present within the United States, but is not in removal proceedings.
Next, the USCIS will have the applicant come in for an initial
background check and get the applicant’s fingerprints.33 Then, the
USCIS will schedule an asylum interview, also known as a credible
fear interview, between the applicant and an asylum officer.34 In
this interview, the asylum officer will determine whether the
applicant is eligible for asylum and whether the applicant is
credible.35 Within weeks, a credibility determination is rendered,
and one of five possible decisions will be given:
[A] grant of asylum; referral to an immigration court;
recommended approval; notice of intent to deny; or denial of
asylum . . . . A decision to refer the applicant to an immigration
court usually occurs if the applicant is not in valid status at the
time of the asylum interview and USCIS was unable to grant
asylum during the initial proceedings.36

Separately, in defensive asylum, the applicant is already in removal
proceedings and is claiming asylum as a defense to removal.37 This
process happens in immigration court as a trial and, thus, is more
adversarial.
While it may be relatively simple to define many of the
protected grounds, such as race and nationality, there has been
more debate surrounding the definition of particular social
groups.38 The United States and other common law countries tend
to follow the “protected characteristic” approach.39 Under this
32. The Affirmative Asylum Process, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Preparing for Your Asylum Interview: What to Expect on the Day of Your
Interview, USCIS (May 12, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugeesasylum/asylum/preparing-your-asylum-interview.
36. Maureen E. Cummins, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Asylum: Why
Procedural Safeguards Are Necessary, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 283, 302
(2013).
37. Id. at 296.
38. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social
Visibility” in Defining a Particular Social Group and Its Potential Impact on Asylum
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47 (2008)
(highlighting the evolution of the definition of “particular social group” since In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)).
39. Id. at 48. “Australia, on the other hand, has emphaszied [sic] social
perceptions, while also taking immutable characteristics into account.” Id. at 49.
The social perceptions approach focuses more on common traits shared by a group,
and whether “the group is set apart from other members of society.” Id. at 58. The
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approach, a particular social group is found where “members have
a ‘common immutable characteristic’ that they ‘either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.’”40 The
BIA expanded this approach when it introduced the “social
visibility” test.41 This test requires that individual group members,
not simply the group itself, be recognizable to the public—a
standard which may be problematic in asylum claims based on
gender-based harm such as domestic violence, since victims may
hide their situation from others.42 This silence could be due to
shame, fear, social tolerance towards domestic violence, financial
dependence on their abuser, or other reasons.43
The BIA spoke to this issue in 2014 when it issued its decision
in In re A-R-C-G- that seemed to better recognize gender-based
harm claims in asylum adjudication.44 The BIA’s new test requires
that a social group be “(1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with ‘particularity,’
and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”45 In its
decision, the BIA recognized “married women in Guatemala who
are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular social group
that met each of the three prongs (i.e., immutability, particularity,
and social distinction).46 Despite this precedent, victims of domestic
violence still face obstacles in establishing the nexus between the
protected ground and past persecution47 in proving that their
government is either unable or unwilling to help them,48 and in
being found credible.
Applicants’ asylum claims often come down to whether, or not,
an immigration judge finds them to be credible.49 The credibility
group does not have to be recognized by society, instead it must only be
distinguishable from society. Id.
40. Id. at 51–52 (quoting In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233).
41. Id. at 63.
42. Id. at 95.
43. Id.
44. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) (finding “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” to be an acceptable particular
social group).
45. Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2016).
46. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388.
47. Bookey, supra note 45, at 16.
48. Id. at 17.
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (“The testimony of the applicant may
be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the
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determination may be based on “the totality of the circumstances,”
including:
the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s
account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
written and oral statements . . . the internal consistency of each
such statement, the consistency of such statements with other
evidence of record . . . and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in
such statements . . . .50

The asylum process can be very emotional for survivors of
persecution due to the reality that their eligibility for asylum will
require that they share very detailed information about the type of
persecution suffered and about their persecutor. Moreover, due to
the nature of the immigration process, their narrative will not
simply be accepted as truth, but instead will be doubted and combed
for inconsistencies. The experience of “reliving” persecution while
being judged for credibility may cause asylum seekers to be revictimized.
III. Re-victimization and the Impact of Past Trauma
The impact of past trauma can affect a survivor’s conduct and
memory.51 Symptoms of trauma may be categorized into three
types: hyperarousal, intrusion, and constriction.52 Hyperarousal
symptoms may cause one to be easily startled, go into permanent
states of alert, or struggle to sleep;53 intrusion symptoms may cause
survivors to have flashbacks or to “relive” both the traumatic event
and the emotional intensity of that event, over and over again;54
constriction symptoms may cause survivors to respond or behave
with emotional detachment or indifference, and they may be so
numb to reality that events may be altered to seem as if they
happened to someone else.55 A critical piece of the healing process

applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible . . . .”);
see also Margaret Graham Tebo, Asylum Ordeals, ABA J. (Nov. 2006),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/asylum_ordeals (“[O]ften documents
are unavailable and so proofs rest on the credibility of the petitioner’s and witnesses’
testimony . . . .”)
50. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
51. Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility, and the
Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for Asylum, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 484
(2016).
52. Id. at 485–86.
53. Id. at 486.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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for many survivors of past trauma is the act of repeatedly telling
their story.56 The ability to describe a traumatic event often relies
on memories of specific sensations and images, so it can be difficult
to describe the event in a linear narrative or with everyday
descriptors.57 Due to this difficulty of (1) reconciling the event for
themselves and (2) conveying this trauma to someone who may have
never experienced something similar, a survivor’s story may tend to
shift or be revised with each narration as they attempt to compile
all of the images and sensations into their own linear narrative of
the event.58
This shifting narrative can be problematic in the asylum
context since an immigration judge will likely be focused on
determining whether the asylum seeker is credible.59 Thus, any
inconsistencies between the narrative told during the credible fear
interview and the court hearing could pose a threat to the asylum
seeker’s claim. This idea of re-victimization, or re-traumatization,
is based on the reality that asylum applicants are faced both with
the uncertainty of whether they will be believed by others and the
fear for their future due to the possibility of being forced to return
to the persecution in their homeland.
IV. Credible Fear Interviews
In respect to affirmative asylum claims,60 credible fear
interviews are intended to be non-adversarial in nature, and
“asylum officers have an affirmative duty to elicit all information
relevant to the legal determination.”61 Moreover, “[t]he applicant
must use as many details as possible to establish his [or her] wellfounded fear of persecution in order to qualify as a refugee.”62
Factors that may influence an asylum officer’s determination are:
the credibility of the applicant, home country conditions, current
United States asylum law, and international human rights law.63
“[I]f the officer determines that an [applicant] does not have a

56. Id. at 490.
57. Id. at 488.
58. Id. at 488–89.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
60. See Cummins, supra note 36, at 301 (noting that those making defensive
asylum claims “must undergo a trial proceeding instead of an interview”).
61. USCIS, LESSON PLAN OVERVIEW: CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER
TRAINING COURSE 12 (Feb. 28, 2014).
62. Cummins, supra note 36, at 300.
63. Id. at 299.
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credible fear of persecution, the officer shall order the [applicant]
removed from the United States without further hearing or
review.”64 After an adverse credibility determination by an asylum
officer, the applicant will be placed in “mandatory detention until
he [or she] is removed from the United States.”65
The USCIS, as an agency of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS),66 employs and trains asylum officers.67 Few officers
are lawyers, but officers do receive training as to relevant
immigration and asylum law.68 As for training, the USCIS requires
that all asylum officers complete the Asylum Officer Basic Training
Course, which is a five-week course where asylum officers are
trained on subjects such as international refugee law, United States
asylum law, interviewing techniques, decision-making, and
writing.69 Additionally, “[a]ll asylum office staff are . . . required to
attend USCIS trainings . . . offered through the USCIS Academy.”70
Separate trainings are offered to provide insight into interviewing
survivors of torture, in particular, how to identify victims of
trafficking, and issues specific to women.71 Asylum interviews are
not recorded, so the only record will be the officer’s written or typed
notes.72 “In 2014, asylum officers granted 47% of the 27,006 claims
they adjudicated, while 50% of [claims] were referred to
immigration courts and 3% were denied.”73

64. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 235(b)(l)(B)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I); but see Cummins, supra note 36, at 299 (stating that
immigration judges will give “prompt review” to an applicant’s case before the actual
removal is executed).
65. Cummins, supra note 36, at 299.
66. See generally Our History, USCIS (May 25, 2011), https://www.uscis.gov/
about-us/our-history (stating that there are three components within DHS: USCIS,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP)).
67. See Asylum Division Training Programs, USCIS https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs
(last
updated Dec. 19, 2016).
68. See Paskey, supra note 51, at 468.
69. Asylum Division Training Programs, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Paskey, supra note 51, at 468.
73. Id. at 470; see also USCIS, AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM APPLICATION STATISTICS
AND DECISIONS ANNUAL REPORT 3 (June 20, 2016).
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V. Approaches for Determining the Weight Given to
Credible Fear Interviews
A. Assessing the Quality of the Interview and Notes
Jimenez was decided in the wake of Moab v. Gonzales, in which
the Seventh Circuit held that too much weight was placed on the
credible fear interview in making a credibility determination
involving an applicant who did not mention his sexual orientation
during the credible fear interview because he was afraid that he
would be further persecuted on that basis.74 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit held in Dong v. Gonzales that airport interviews “are not
always reliable indicators of credibility.”75 The Seventh Circuit
adopted the Second Circuit’s “list of nonexclusive factors” for
“determining the reliability of an asylum applicant’s preliminary
interview.”76 To determine whether the notes from a credible fear
interview are reliable, the Third Circuit looks at (1) whether the
record of the interview is a verbatim transcript of the conversation,
or simply a summary; (2) whether follow-up questions were asked
in order to get more details relating to the asylum claim; (3) whether
the applicant is reluctant to talk to government officials due to
negative past experiences with government officials in their home
country; and (4) whether the applicant’s answers sound as though
they understood the questions being asked of them.77 Conversely,
the Second Circuit finds an inherent difference in the nature of
asylum interviews and airport interviews, thus it treats them
differently and does not see the same need to assess the reliability
of asylum interviews.78

74. Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2007).
75. 421 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2005).
76. Moab, 500 F.3d at 661. See generally Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d
169, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the Second Circuit, likewise, adopted the
Third Circuit’s list of factors to determine whether notes from an airport interview
could be considered reliable).
77. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 180.
78. See S. KATHLEEN PEPPER & FATIMAH A. MATEEN, ASYLUM CREDIBILITY AND
CORROBORATING EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS AND IN THE BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS OUTLINE 31 (2006), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
cba6/68cac2622b7d2831e4d8b8fc5bb2aee04e17.pdf (last updated Mar. 2011); cf. id.
at 53 (stating that the Third Circuit views the context and flaws of an asylum
interview and airport interview as similar).
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B. Judicial Discretion
The Eleventh Circuit has chosen not to take the approach
utilized by the Seventh and Second Circuits.79 Rather, the Eleventh
Circuit gives full discretion to immigration judges to determine
whether notes from credible fear interviews are sufficient and
reliable.80 Likewise, Congress, through the REAL ID Act,81 gives
immigration judges substantial discretion,82 both in making
credibility determinations and in choosing the factors on which they
base these determinations.83 However, the Eleventh Circuit does
utilize the specific, cogent reason standard.84 When a judge bases
an adverse credibility finding on inconsistencies between the notes
from the credible fear interview and the asylum seeker’s personal
testimony or asylum application, the Eleventh Circuit has held that
the immigration judge’s finding will only be upheld if it was
supported by specific, cogent reasons.85
While the specific, cogent reason standard does help to avoid
adverse credibility findings based on immaterial inconsistencies, it
does not push immigration judges to further question applicants
and attempt to reconcile material inconsistencies that may have
valid explanations.86 This makes it especially important that
asylum seekers strive to convey a linear narrative that outsiders
can follow, because a shifting narrative could be viewed as a
specific, cogent reason for an adverse credibility finding.

79. See Yan Jin Zao v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 192 F. App’x 825, 827 (11th Cir. 2006)
(stating that the court had “never held that it is reversible error for an [immigration
judge] to fail to evaluate an airport statement using these factors”).
80. Id. But see Pepper & Mateen, supra note 78, at 158–159 (“[A]irport
statements should not form the exclusive basis of an adverse credibility finding.”).
81. Pub. L. No.109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
82. But cf. Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deference is
earned; it is not a birthright.”).
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); accord id at (iii).
84. See Pepper, supra note 78, at 152 (“An Immigration Judge’s adverse
credibility finding must be supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons.’”).
85. See Chen v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 463 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
Forgue v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005)).
86. See generally Aden v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 966, 968–69 (8th Cir. 2005).
Concurring Judge Heaney agreed that the immigration judge found specific, cogent
reasons to find the applicant’s testimony incredible, but stated that “[i]t would have
been very helpful had the [immigration judge] taken the time . . . to attempt to
resolve the inconsistencies.” This was especially so since the applicant would have
been qualified for relief had she been able to reconcile her story. Id.
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VI. Analysis of the Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch Decision
Asylum seekers often arrive with little to no corroborating
evidence to support their asylum petition.87 Therefore, their
narrative of the traumatic event, or events, is often their main
evidence of the past persecution that they have suffered. However,
in Ms. Jimenez’s case, she provided “over 400 pages of documentary
evidence” with her petition for asylum, including the police
complaint from her 2007 sexual assault, a doctor’s report, and a
psychologist’s report.88 The doctor’s report stated that Ms. Jimenez
had “‘visible signs and marks of a strangulation attempt’ and a ‘torn
inner and outer labia of the vagina, evidencing penetration by force
or with resistance on the part of the victim.’”89 Similarly, the
psychologist’s report mentioned that she showed “signs and
symptoms of tension, worry, fear for her life and the lives of her
family[,]” and recommended that Ms. Jimenez “‘be referred
immediately to group therapy’ to ‘help her overcome the trauma.’”90
Despite having material evidence that corroborated her story, Ms.
Jimenez’s testimony was still not accepted as credible. This is a
reality that many asylum seekers face. Despite their best efforts,
their traumatic experiences “may not be accurately legitimated and
accepted by outsiders,” such as asylum officers or immigration
judges.91
One must consider whether it is possible to effectively judge
the credibility of a person coping with trauma within an adversarial
system. Judges use factors such as demeanor, candor, and the
internal consistency of each statement to determine an applicant’s
credibility.92 However, these factors can be poor gauges when
considering the difficulty many survivors of abuse or persecution
have in articulating a linear narrative that effectively summarizes
their experiences.93 Similarly, the applicant may feel shame or

87. See USCIS, INTERVIEWING SURVIVORS OF TORTURE AND OTHER SEVERE
TRAUMA: TRAINING MODULE 25 subd. 10.2 (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
https://refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Interviewing-Survivors-ofTorture-2015.pdf.
88. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Erin Rider, Asylum Seekers’ Credibility Burden: Managing Trauma in
the Asylum Process Without Collective Support, 2 J. OF SOC. & SOC. WORK 263, 269
(2014).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
93. This is especially so when language is an additional barrier to the process.
In Ms. Jimenez’s case, her credible fear interview was conducted while in detention
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embarrassment in disclosing the abuse they suffered.94 Ms.
Jimenez personally felt this: she testified “that she was ashamed
and ‘embarrassed’ to discuss Holguin’s abuse.”95 Similarly, a
shifting narrative may very well be an applicant’s attempt to
grapple with the extent of the trauma they have suffered, and thus,
they may still be trying to reconcile their situation for themselves.
In addition to having to accept the facts of their claim for
themselves, applicants must also persuade outsiders that they can,
and should, be believed.
As previously mentioned, the impact of past trauma can affect
a survivor’s conduct and memory.96 While in detention, Ms.
Jimenez did not immediately disclose to her detaining officers that
she feared having to return to the Dominican Republic, “because
she was nervous, afraid and ashamed to tell the male officer
conducting the interview about her ex-husband’s abuse.”97 Upon
expressing her fear of returning, she was given a credible fear
interview.98 “Ms. Jimenez was confused and nervous during her
credible fear interview, and embarrassed to be telling the intimate
details of her relationship with Holguin to a complete stranger and
an unknown telephonic interpreter.”99 However, despite these
barriers, the asylum officer found Ms. Jimenez to have a credible
fear of persecution and, thus, she was released.100 In contrast, the
immigration judge was not similarly persuaded and found Ms.
Jimenez incredible based on “glaring inconsistencies.”101
The issue with the current state of determining credibility
within the immigration court setting is that the focus is not actually
on the facts of the case, but instead the applicant’s unwavering

with an asylum officer and a telephonic interpreter. See Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d
at 806. Some of the inconsistencies that the immigration judge noted were due to
breakdowns in translation during the credible fear interview. See Brief for Petitioner
at 21–28, Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2603);
accord Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 807–08.
94. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 30 (“Ms. Jimenez testified
that Holguin’s physical and sexual abuse had a significant impact on her emotional
and mental well-being, to the extent that her family insisted she see a therapist, but
that it is still extremely difficult for her to discuss the physical and sexual abuse to
this day.”).
95. Id.
96. See Paskey, supra note 51, at 484.
97. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 8.
98. Id. at 9.
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2016).
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consistency in relaying traumatic details.102 Note that in Jimenez,
the immigration judge overlooked the medical report, which noted
the injuries Ms. Jimenez suffered due to the 2007 Christmas Eve
attack103 and instead focused on her timeline of those events—i.e.,
whether Mr. Holguin beat and raped her before or after the party
on Christmas Eve.104 Thus, the immigration judge placed the
emphasis on the time of the attack, rather than the actual attack.
The persecution suffered was the attack itself, which could be
corroborated with the medical report, psychologist’s report, and
police complaint. The technical issues should not be completely
ignored, because finding material inconsistencies may be a sign of
a fraudulent asylum claim. At the same time, minor technical
issues should not be the basis of an immigration judge’s
determination, especially where corroborating evidence exists.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees asylum seekers, and more
generally “person[s],”105 a due process “right to have a claim heard
by a neutral, impartial arbiter.”106 The importance of impartiality
is reaffirmed in the Ethics and Professionalism Guide for
Immigration Judges, which states that judges should perform their
responsibilities without showing prejudice.107 However, an asylum
seeker’s fate will be greatly impacted by which judge presides over
his or her case, as well as the region of the United States where the
case is heard.108 While the national average asylum grant rate was
48% in 2015, many regions had much lower grant rates: Atlanta,
Georgia (2%), Las Vegas, Nevada (7%), Dallas, Texas (9%), Houston,
Texas (9%), Charlotte, North Carolina (13%), and Detroit, Michigan
(14%).109 Similarly, the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO) noted significant variations in asylum outcomes

102. See Graham Tebo, supra note 49 (stating that the “credibility determination
is where some immigration judges seem to go off the rails, according to circuit court
opinions”).
103. Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 807–08.
104. Id. at 808.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
106. James L. Buchwalter, Existence and Effect of Bias by Immigration Judge, 45
A.L.R. FED. 2D 219 § 2.
107. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM GUIDE FOR
IMMIGRATION JUDGES IX (2011).
108. Due Process Denied: Central Americans Seeking Asylum and Legal Protection
in the United States, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N at 22 (June 16, 2016).
109. Id. Cf. Paskey, supra note 51, at 509 (“At the opposite end of the spectrum,
judges in New York City granted 84% of the claims they adjudicated. The grant rate
was also higher than average in Arlington, Virginia (71%); Honolulu (74%);
Philadelphia (59%); and San Francisco (59%).”).
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depending on the court’s region and the judge hearing the case.110
For instance, “affirmative applicants in San Francisco were . . . 12
times more likely than those in Atlanta to be granted asylum.”111
Some blame judicial bias and the role of politics in appointing
immigration judges;112 others blame a backlogged and broken
system.113 “Weighed down by a backlog of more than 520,000 cases,
the United States immigration courts are foundering, increasingly
failing to deliver timely, fair decisions to people fighting deportation
or asking for refuge . . . .”114 This overwhelming case load also
undermines the gravity of the decisions that immigration judges are
being asked to make.115 The years of waiting injure asylum seekers
because they face the reality that their evidence may become stale
and their memory of past events will decay. For Ms. Jimenez, her
hearing occurred in 2013, but many of the relevant events that she
was expected to relay in detail occurred between 2007 and 2009.116
There was an expectation that Ms. Jimenez be able to remember
and articulate, in a linear narrative, specific details of events that
had happened nearly four to six years prior.117 In her case, the
immigration judge was concerned about discrepancies as to details,
110. U.S. Asylum System: Significant Variation Existed in Asylum Outcomes
Across Immigration Courts and Judges, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Sept.
2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/281817.pdf (highlighting findings of the GAO08-940 Report, which found that nine factors greatly affected the variability in
asylum outcomes, one such factor being the gender of the immigration judge).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Elise Foley, Here’s Why Atlanta Is One of The Worst Places To Be
An Undocumented Immigrant, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25,
2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/deportation-raids-immigration-courts_us_
574378d9e4b0613b512b0f37 (“The process is supposed to be apolitical, but it hasn’t
always been—President George W. Bush’s administration for years asked certain
immigration judges about their political views. Those vetted judges . . . were more
likely than others to deny asylum.”); Julia Preston, Deluged Immigration Courts,
Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin to Buckle, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/deluged-immigration-courts-where-casesstall-for-years-begin-to-buckle.html (noting that immigration courts tend to be
affected more by federal political changes because they fall under the Department of
Justice, whereas other federal courts fall under the judiciary).
113. See Preston, supra note 112, at 2 (“With too few judges, overworked clerks
and an antiquated docket based on stacks of paper files, many of the 56 courts
nationwide have become crippled by delays and bureaucratic breakdowns.”).
114. Id.
115. See Stuart L. Lustig, et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative
Responses from the National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout
Survey, 23 GEO. IMM. L.J. 57, 73 (“This job is supposed to be about doing justice. The
conditions under which we work make it more and more challenging to ensure that
justice is done.”).
116. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2016).
117. Id.
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such as what time of day she was raped on Christmas Eve in 2007,
the exact date she was last raped, the location she was last raped,
and whether Mr. Holguin had hit her son.118 There are general
issues confronting a survivor’s ability to articulate a linear
narrative regarding traumatic events, but these issues may also be
compounded by the long length of time it takes to get a hearing.
Aside from the problems created by the backlog of cases, there
are also disparities in denial rates within jurisdictions that make
judicial bias, political sway, and general inexperience more likely
culprits. For instance, in July 2006, Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, a research organization associated with Syracuse
University, released a study stating that Chinese immigrants make
up almost twenty-two percent of asylum seekers in the United
States. 119 The study found that in New York there was a grave
disparity in the grant rates for Chinese asylees represented by
lawyers––one judge denied almost seven percent of petitions, while
another denied ninety-four percent.120
Circuit courts have
questioned the skill and temperament of some immigration judges,
mainly those who have been repeatedly appealed.121 Note that
“[a]bout half of the judges appointed in [the] 2004-2007 period had
no experience with immigration law.”122
The purpose of the credible fear interview is to “identify
potentially meritorious claims to protection.”123 Similarly, USCIS
training materials describe the credible fear interview as simply a
“screening process,”124 yet in Ms. Jimenez’s case, the notes from her
credible fear interview held substantial weight before the
immigration judge.125 The inconsistencies between these notes and
118. Id. at 807–08.
119. See Graham Tebo, supra note 49.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Foley, supra note 112.
123. USCIS, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 11
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecutionand-torture.pdf.
124. See id. at 17.
125. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The
[immigration judge] was especially troubled by the fact that ‘[b]oth the police
complaint and her credible-fear interview indicate that [Ms. Jimenez] was not
attacked by Holguin after she returned from the dinner party on Christmas Eve, as
she testified at her hearing, but that the violence occurred before she was able to go
to the party . . . .”); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 10 (“The
[immigration judge]’s decision rests primarily on perceived inconsistencies between
the summary translation of Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear interview and her testimony
at her hearing and her documentary evidence.”).
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the applicant’s testimony often serve as the basis for adverse
credibility findings without much concern about the reliability of
those notes.126 In Jimenez, the Seventh Circuit found that Ms.
Jimenez had consistently maintained that Mr. Holguin raped her
on Christmas Eve and that the medical report corroborated her
claim.127 Thus, the possible discrepancies—regarding the precise
time of day that the violence occurred—between the interview notes
and Ms. Jimenez’s testimony, asylum application, and
corroborating evidence was found to be a trivial discrepancy for the
immigration judge to use as the basis for an adverse credibility
finding.128 More than that, the Seventh Circuit was concerned by
how much weight was placed on Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear
interview, since it was not a verbatim transcript, and because it
should not have been given more weight than all of the supporting
evidence she provided.129
Courts should question the reliability of credible fear interview
notes due to the nature of those interviews.130 The asylum officer’s
notes are the only record of the interview.131 A verbatim transcript
would provide a judge with more insight into the nature of the
questions and answers, rather than a simple summary of the
dialogue.132 Similarly, a verbatim transcript would allow the judge
to see whether the asylum officer asked relevant follow-up
questions to seek more details and information from the
applicant.133 For instance, Ms. Jimenez’s responses to some of the
asylum officer’s questions give the impression that she either “did
not understand [the] question[] . . . or that the interpretation was
unclear to her.”134 If the notes are only a summary, then the judge

126. Cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 10–11 (stating that the immigration
judge’s “decision ignored or discounted Ms. Jimenez’s consistent and compelling
testimony, both at the hearing and in her original asylum application and
accompanying affidavit, and the substance of the corroborating evidence she
submitted to the [immigration judge].”).
127. Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 811.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 810.
130. Recall that Ms. Jimenez’s credible fear interview took place in detention with
an asylum officer and a telephonic translator. See id. at 806.
131. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 15 n.3 (arguing that the
Government offered no further evidence “to bolster or supplement the notes”).
132. Cf. id. at 14–15 (stating that the asylum officer’s summary notes from Ms.
Jimenez’s credible fear interview were “incomplete” and “often incoherent . . . as
evidenced by numerous grammatical and syntactical lapses.”).
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id.
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has no way of knowing whether the applicant’s answers were
evasive and vague, or whether the asylum officer failed to ask the
appropriate follow-up questions to gain more insight into, and
details from, the applicant’s story.135 Moreover, a verbatim record
would allow the judge to interpret the nature of the interaction
between the officer and the applicant. For example, the applicant
may indicate reluctance in terms of talking to government officials
based on negative experiences in his or her homeland. In Ms.
Jimenez’s case, she had filed a complaint with the police in the
Dominican Republic, and based on this, Mr. Holguin was arrested—
but he was released from jail four days later.136 Ms. Jimenez had
voiced a distrust of law enforcement in the Dominican Republic.137
Thus, it would not be difficult to understand that she may similarly
have been reluctant to speak to the United States asylum officer
regarding a topic as sensitive as past physical and sexual abuse.138
In general, these factors come down to verifying that the asylum
officer’s notes serve as a reliable record of the credible fear interview
and, thus, a reliable tool to use in determining an applicant’s overall
credibility. This approach seems to look at decisions based
primarily on credible fear interview notes as being a red flag,
therefore, the Seventh Circuit stresses the importance of assessing
the reliability of these notes before using them as the basis for an
adverse credibility determination.139
Conclusion
Reforming the immigration system has been a topic of
discussion for some time.140 Yet, little change has been made to
135. Id. (“The [asylum] officer never follows-up to clarify if ‘Sanchez and Ysavelita’
is the name of a town, neighborhood, [] apartment complex or the location of the
friend’s home where she initially fled after Holguin beat and raped her.”).
136. Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2016).
137. Id. at 807; accord Brief for Petitioner, supra note 93, at 3 (“The Dominican
police provided essentially no protection to Ms. Jimenez, despite the complaint she
filed with them following the first instance of abuse, and the many complaints Ms.
Jimenez’s mother filed after Holguin sent her threatening letters.”).
138. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 803
(7th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-2603) (“Ms. Jimenez was expected to disclose intimate details
of abuse—including rape—to government agents when her prior experience with
police in the Dominican Republic was negative and would likely have engendered
mistrust of the authorities.”).
139. See Jimenez Ferreira, 831 F.3d at 809.
140. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES (2010); Paskey, supra
note 51, at 507–508; Lustig, supra note 115, at 81–82.
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correct the backlogged and politically shifting nature of the
immigration system.141 Within the context of the current system,
circuit courts should follow the approach utilized by the Seventh
Circuit in Jimenez Ferreira v. Lynch and assess the quality of
asylum interviews and the notes from said interviews in order to
decide the level of weight and credence the notes ought to be given
in determining the applicant’s credibility.
This could be
accomplished by circuits establishing their own factors to consider
in assessing the quality of the interview and notes, or by adopting
the four nonexclusive factors utilized by the Third Circuit and
adopted by the Seventh Circuit: (1) whether the record of the
interview is a verbatim transcript of the conversation, or simply a
summary; (2) whether follow-up questions were asked in order to
get more details relating to the asylum claim; (3) whether the
applicant is reluctant to talk to government officials due to negative
past experiences with government officials in their home country;
and (4) whether the applicant’s answers sound as though they
understood the questions being asked of them.142
The benefit of utilizing the aforementioned factors is that it
first requires the immigration judge to determine whether it would
be fair to base an adverse credibility finding on inconsistencies in
the asylum officer’s notes, or between the notes and the applicant’s
testimony. If the notes are simply a summary of a more detailed
conversation, or if the asylum officer failed to ask relevant followup questions, these flaws should not be held against the applicant
as a blemish on his or her character or credibility. Utilizing these
factors will better aid judges in making credibility determinations
based on the applicant’s own inconsistencies and discrepancies,
rather than inconsistencies due to flaws in the process.
Additional measures should be taken to train judges on the
effects that coping with trauma may have on an applicant’s ability
to provide a linear narrative. Asylum is different from many other
claims because the applicants often have no corroborating evidence
and no documents proving persecution. Thus, their claim comes
down to their testimony. Moreover, the applicant has much—such
as their life and future—riding on the immigration judge’s decision.
141. Some scholars advocate for asylum claims to be handled in a non-adversarial
system by expanding the current asylum offices and adjudicating the claims in a less
confrontational hearing. Others prefer the idea of categorizing the immigration
court system as an Article III court, which would lessen the effects of federal political
shifts. Another option would be to create a specialty court specifically for asylum
claims. Paskey, supra note 51, at 514–515.
142. See Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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Measures like training immigration judges on the ways in which
survivors cope with trauma and the impacts this may have on their
testimony, training immigration judges and asylum officers on
implicit bias, and funding additional judicial clerks may help
address the issues raised in this note. In such high stakes cases, it
is extremely important that immigration judges are given the
necessary tools to most effectively perform the duties of their
position.

